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 This paper seeks to lay out several key arguments, after a thorough examination of 
economic data and political evidence, focused around the idea that, while it might have been 
designed as such, the Eurozone is not currently operating as an optimal currency area.  Care is 
taken to explain the criteria for an optimal currency area, and the Eurozone’s status in regards 
to each of these applicable criteria. 
 The paper then moves on to examine some key comparisons that can be made between 
Europe and the United States, particularly as it relates to the United States as a model for 
Europe, and also examines some key steps that policymakers could take to move Europe closer 
to fulfilling the criteria for being an optimal currency area.  It concludes with broader questions 
about the European and global implications of these policymakers’ decisions in response to the 
Eurozone crisis and the effects that these decisions will have on the political and economic 
landscape in Europe and the Eurozone in the short run and the long run. 
  
 Koziara 5 
 
Introduction and Background 
What is the Eurozone? 
 On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the first building 
blocks of what would later become one of the greatest experiments in political, economic, and 
social integration of the twenty-first century and beyond: the European Union.  With the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris, signed in 
1951, the countries of Western Europe, which had fought for centuries and were now ravaged 
by two World Wars, finally linked their heavy industries of coal and steel production to prevent 
any nation from single-handedly building weaponry essential for any future conflict.  What 
would follow in the next sixty years would be nothing short of remarkable.  The small Coal and 
Steel Community would expand, enlarge, and evolve into a single market, breaking down 
economic, political, and cultural barriers between countries and growing to encompass most of 
the European continent.  With a European Union-wide gross domestic product (GDP) of 
€12.629 trillion ($17.578 trillion) in 2011 (Eurostat),1 it is the single-largest economic entity by 
GDP in the world, with the Eurozone accounting for over seventy-five percent, or €9.4 trillion, 
of GDP.  Indeed, the process of political and economic integration, particularly within the 
Eurozone, has led to some of the fastest integration ever seen during the course of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. 
 In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty went into effect, paving the way for the introduction of 
the euro in 1999 and the circulation of euro notes and coin in 2002.  The Maastricht Treaty also 
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established key convergence criteria for member states of the newly-proposed currency zone, 
which would hypothetically maintain some semblance of similarity and congruence between 
member states’ economies, so as hopefully to prevent the type of regional shocks or disparate 
conditions that could make such a monetary union unworkable.  The Stability and Growth Pact 
was specifically designed to guarantee such convergence and to ensure price stability and fiscal 
responsibility amongst members.  For nearly a decade after the introduction of the euro, the 
countries of the Eurozone enjoyed the same low interest rates, stable growth, and relative 
interstate political harmony.  Yet following the global financial crisis in 2007-08, European 
markets became susceptible to fears of sovereign debt defaults, interest rates skyrocketed, and 
large banks and countries alike teetered on the brink of fiscal collapse. 
So what went wrong?  Why is the Eurozone now in a state of malaise, with sovereign 
debt crises, out-of-control interest rates, shrinking economies, and a seeming inability to find 
either an economic or political solution to such problems?  How did the greatest experiment in 
international economic and political cooperation begin to show signs of duress and potential 
collapse within such a short period of time after enjoying such rapid integration, growth, and 
preferential treatment from world markets?  The answer is not an easy one, and rather than 
treat the issues facing the Eurozone as Euro-wide issues, one must examine specific countries 
and their economic and political ills on a case-by-case basis in order to get a full picture of the 
current situation.   
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The Eurozone as an OCA 
 Sharing a common currency was seen, by the architects of the Maastricht Treaty, as 
another step on the road toward fuller economic integration and the single market.  With the 
two important stages in the introduction of a common currency, the euro (€), in 1999 and 2002, 
the nations of the Eurozone moved the closest yet to economic integration, tying their 
exchange rates together and agreeing to denominate all debts in euros.  It was the largest 
economic integration of a currency area that the world had seen since the unification of the 
United States into a monetary union under the dollar over two centuries earlier. 
 Yet simply sharing a common currency does not translate into economic symmetry and 
integration, nor does it portend unlimited and infinite economic and political harmony.  It is 
important, in an analysis of monetary union in Europe, to turn to the pioneering work of Nobel 
Prize-winning Canadian economist Robert Mundell, who first described in the 1960s what is 
today known as the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA).  In his work, “A Theory of Optimum 
Currency Areas” (Mundell), Mundell asserted that there is a balance required in making the 
determination as to whether or not to share a currency, based upon the costs and benefits 
involved with the decision and the effects of a monetary union.  And while many of the 
economic constructs and institutions of the 1960s have evolved or changed today (most 
notably the end of the Bretton-Woods system of pegged exchange rates), Mundell’s work still 
carries important implications for any currency shared between more than one country, 
including the euro. 
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 What, then, is an optimal currency area?  In its simplest form, as Mundell describes it, 
an optimal currency area is a region, or area, where the benefits of sharing a common currency 
outweigh the costs; an area where a single currency would create the greatest economic 
efficiency, or benefit.  Such a region need not be supranational; in fact, much of Mundell’s 
original essay on optimal currency areas focused on the idea of intra-national or sub-national 
regions as optimal currency areas.2  Only after the idea of European integration took hold in the 
second half of the twentieth century was Mundell’s theory practically applied to an 
international entity, that is, the Eurozone. 
 What are the benefits of sharing a common currency?  According to Mundell and other 
prominent economists, one of the most obvious benefits is lowered transaction costs; that is, 
the cost of making an economic exchange.  In terms of the Eurozone, this primarily refers to the 
costs incurred when doing business or conducting an economic transaction, with a different 
country with a different currency.  The complexity of over a dozen currencies in such a 
relatively small geographic area (such as Europe) in which to conduct business would 
presumably lead to many headaches and inconveniences over the need to exchange currencies 
at varying exchange rates, particularly after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 
1970s and the advent of floating exchange rates.   
 There are other benefits to an optimal currency area, however.  One of the most 
important is increased capital mobility, or the flexibility with which investors, whether 
                                                          
2
 There are four generally-accepted criteria for an optimal currency area: labor mobility across the region, capital 
mobility and relative price and wage flexibility, some sort of risk-sharing system across the region (which could, in 
many cases, comprise fiscal transfers), and relative similarity of business cycles across the region.  For further 
detail, refer to “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas” (Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas). 
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individuals or businesses, can move capital throughout an area.  This became particularly 
important in the latter half of the twentieth century, with an increased focus on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) both into and originating from Europe.  In addition to capital mobility, labor 
mobility is also a key benefit for an optimal currency area.  In an optimal currency area, labor, 
like capital, should be mostly mobile; that is, workers should be free and able to move from one 
part of the region to another depending on where employment is most available.  It is 
important to note the potential difficulty for Europe here, with its dense mix of national 
cultures and languages in a relatively small geographic area, especially compared to other large 
economic actors worldwide (e.g. United States, China, etc.).  This is a very important 
consideration. 
 What, then, are the costs to sharing a common currency?  There are many, and possibly 
others yet to be discovered or understood; however, the most obvious comes in the form of a 
loss by each participant (whether a nation, province, etc.) in an optimal currency area of some, 
if not all, of their autonomy over fiscal and monetary policy, and with it, the loss of 
interventional tools that could be used to stabilize the economy in the event of a regional 
shock.  When a regional shock strikes one region of a currency area, such as a drop in demand 
for a region-specific commodity, and unemployment rises in that region, all else remaining 
equal in other regions of the currency area, what are policymakers, or the central banking 
authority to do?  Increasing the money supply would stem unemployment in the affected 
region, but would cause inflation in other regions, where no comparable economic shock was 
felt.  Thus, Mundell asserts, the pace of inflation would be “set by the willingness of central 
authorities to allow unemployment in deficit regions,” that is to say, in the region 
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asymmetrically experiencing an economic shock.  Therefore, joining together two or more 
political entities or geographic areas or sub-regions ties the hands of fiscal and monetary 
policymakers in no uncertain terms, at least to some extent.  Further treatment regarding this 
important aspect of optimal currency area theory in the context of Europe will be given later in 
this paper.  It suffices to note here, however, that while the Eurozone was seen by many, 
including Mundell, as the ideal candidate area for testing optimal currency area theory in the 
years leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007-08, there is now considerable doubt as to 
whether or not the Eurozone sustains – or is even capable of sustaining – the criteria necessary 
to be labeled as an optimal currency area, as evidenced by the substantial economic divergence 
among member states. 
Did anyone see this coming?  
Some of the doubt as to whether or not Europe would fulfill the criteria for being an 
optimal currency area was expressed hypothetically in the 1980s and 1990s, even before 
concrete plans were in place to create a monetary union in Europe, by economists such as Barry 
Eichengreen and Martin Feldstein.3  Indeed, Europe was seen by many economists as an ideal 
candidate area to test Mundell’s optimal currency area theory, but others saw too many factors 
(in the form of different and divergent states) in the economic realities of the states to make 
real, functional monetary union workable in Europe.  However, most of these concerns dealt 
with skepticism over the theory of optimal currency areas in general; that is, they warned of 
                                                          
3
 See “Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?” (Eichengreen) and “EMU and International Conflict” (Feldstein) for a 
closer read on some of the primary concerns as to why Europe would not form an optimal currency area.  In the 
case of Eichengreen, much doubt was cast on Europe’s progress towards becoming an OCA in the model of the 
United States; Feldstein warns explicitly of the lack of autonomy over individual national economic policies, stating 
that such factors could lead to potential international conflict. 
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political disunity stemming from economic chaos if the proper political structures were not in 
place.  As Jacques de Larosière, former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
and former Governor of the Banque de France, points out, the markets were blind to whether 
or not Europe was indeed an optimal currency area.  There was, essentially, a prevailing 
assumption that a shared currency meant shared risk (and thus the assumption of “bailouts” in 
some form, should they be necessary).  Nowhere is this false assumption more evident than in 
an examination of the interest rates of some key Eurozone countries.  Because of the belief in 
shared risk, interest rates for Eurozone countries, from Germany to Greece, tracked along an 
almost identical path during the period from 2000-2009.  Only in 2009, according to de 
Larosière and evidenced by the interest rates shown here, did the markets “wake up” and 
realize that Greek bonds, and later the bonds of other countries on the periphery, were not as 
safe as many of the other Eurozone members’ bonds, largely as a result of the economic 
divergences amongst the members of the Eurozone. 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix B for 
further detail and rates by country and year.)  
When the markets “woke up” to the reality of divergence between the health of various 
Eurozone members’ economies in 2009 and 2010, interest rates diverged and rose rapidly for 
those countries considered most at risk. 
The United States as an OCA? 
 For a crisis of such scale, and for an economic and political entity of such size, is there 
any example or comparative study for which Europe can look for reference or history? Indeed 
there is.  Many economists, notably Barry Eichengreen4 and Hugh Rockoff,5 have written about 
the United States as a currency area, and of the obstacles and challenges that the United States 
has faced along the way to becoming an optimal currency area.  While the United States’ path 
to becoming an optimal currency area could be considered unique because of certain factor 
                                                          
4
 “Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?” (Eichengreen) discusses some of the key differences between the United 
States and Europe in regards to progress towards becoming an OCA 
5
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endowments and inherent advantages described by both Rockoff and Eichengreen, there are 
certainly lessons and examples to be learned from the nearly seventy-plus year history of the 
United States as it became an optimal currency area, from the introduction of the greenback 
during the Civil War to the implementation of large-scale federal fiscal transfers and increased 
labor mobility in the New Deal and post-World War II.  Further analysis of the United States as a 
potential model for the Eurozone will be given later in this paper. 
Focus 
 What, then, is the optimal currency area arrangement for Europe, and for the Eurozone, 
that balances the current fiscal and monetary needs and realities of the European states, given 
the past history of currency unions and the current economic crisis and its political effects? 
Global Implications and Perspective  
The Eurozone crisis is not limited to Europe, however; there are some important aspects 
of the topic of the single currency that must be recognized and explored.  Perhaps most 
important is that the crisis of the Eurozone is a crisis with global implications.  The effects of the 
crisis, whether positive or negative, are felt by markets across the globe and have important 
worldwide economic consequences.  World markets have followed political and economic 
developments in the Eurozone with great attention and detail, responding disproportionately at 
times to such developments.  The market reactions to the crisis demonstrate a high level of 
concern about the crisis; for example, the reactions of world markets following the decisions of 
June 29, 2012, and also following the German Constitutional Court’s ruling of September 12, 
2012, which found the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to be constitutional, effectively 
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paving the way for joint euro funds to be used to buy sovereign debt directly from troubled 
governments (Smith, European Stocks Rally After German Ruling).6  The resolution and effects 
of this crisis no longer stop at the edge of the European Continent.  
However, there is an important distinction to be made between defining the crisis as a 
global crisis, and defining it as a crisis with global implications.  According to Jacques de 
Larosière, while European policymakers must keep the global effects of their decisions in mind, 
the crisis is a European one, with European causes and factors:  “The Eurozone crisis is a 
product of the policies pursued by European policymakers.  They know that the effects of their 
proposed solutions will be felt outside of Europe.  But they must come up with those solutions 
on their own; in effect, the problems of Europe must be solved by Europe.”  
More importantly, as de Larosière and others have noted, the crisis of the Euro requires 
both a short-term “fix” and a longer-term, more structurally-based solution.  While many 
policymakers have declined to endorse specific targeted proposals in the way of spending cuts, 
revenue increases, and the like, there is widespread agreement, according to de Larosière, that 
the underlying structural problems facing the single market will not, and cannot, be solved only 
with a temporary “fix” that could be used to stem the crisis in the immediate future.  Simply 
agreeing on the European Stability Mechanism or on the next bailout of Greek or Spanish banks 
will not solve the Eurozone’s crisis in the long term, even if such steps do calm world markets 
and lead to lower interest rates in the short run.  
                                                          
6
 For more on market reactions to these decisions, see “World Markets Cheer EU Deal” (Smith) 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/29/investing/world-markets/index.htm 
“European Stocks Rally After German Ruling” (Smith) http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/12/investing/world-
markets-germany/index.html 
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What, then, are the long-term structural problems facing the single market?  Or, 
perhaps it is more accurate to reword the question as: what are the long-term structural issues 
facing member nations in the Eurozone that have led to so much difficulty in weathering the 
current crisis?  Did the expansion of the Eurozone as a currency area occur too quickly?  What 
comparisons can be drawn with the United States and its emergence as an optimal currency 
area?  What lessons can be learned?  These are all important questions with which European 
policymakers will undoubtedly wrestle, informed by the history of the European Union and the 
single market thus far.   
It is important also to recognize, as is stated in the works of Michael Bordo, Lars Jonung, 
Hugh Rockoff, Jacques de Larosière, and others, that no level of political union can force 
economic integration by fiat, and most importantly, that a shared currency does not, in and of 
itself, beget economic convergence.  Indeed, much of the Eurozone’s economic integration thus 
far has largely consisted of a sort of “de jure” integration into a single currency area, lacking the 
broad, sweeping policy tools to create and foster macroeconomic convergence amongst 
member states.  That is to say, political structures and institutions such the Euro, the European 
Central Bank, and even the Schengen Area have been created to oversee an economically 
integrated Europe, but little has been done to foster actual economic convergence.  It will only 
be when economic convergence is achieved that the Eurozone will attain a “de facto” sense of 
real integration, whether through natural market convergence, or more likely, through 
government intervention in the economy.  Such intervention can take many forms; however, it 
will only be when stability and real integration are achieved that other economic issues become 
less of a threat. 
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It will be very difficult for economic considerations to override the entrenched political 
institutions of the European Union and the single currency.  To do so would be to undermine 
much of the economic and political integration of the past sixty years.  But the manner in which 
policymakers and statesmen approach the solutions to the current problem will have far-
reaching effects and consequences – not just on the economic and financial state of the 
Eurozone, but on governance of the Union, Continent-wide social and cultural flows and 
exchanges, and the global economy. 
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Literature Review 
Although much has been written about the Eurozone as a monetary union, and certainly 
much more has been written in recent times in regards to the sovereign debt crisis, much of 
this literature fails to examine whether or not the Eurozone can meet the criteria for being an 
optimal currency area.  Furthermore, while Europe (or subsets of various country arrangements 
within Europe) has been at times used as an example of a possible currency area candidate in 
OCA literature, there is little material on the practical reality of Europe and the Eurozone as an 
optimal currency area in light of the current crisis affecting the Eurozone.  Indeed, in examining 
source material and past work done on the topic, it became apparent that much of the writing 
about the Eurozone, or a theoretical currency union in Europe, as an OCA was done in the 
1980s and 1990s before Maastricht, and before the Eurozone had actually taken shape.  Thus, 
much of the hypothetical conjectures and predictions regarding the feasibility of such a 
monetary arrangement (or lack thereof) are just that, with no real-world experience to back 
them up.  While current approaches to the crisis examine many of the proposed solutions, both 
short-term and long-term, and several touch on the key underlying issues affecting the 
Eurozone and each of its member countries, little has been made of the divergences between 
these countries, and whether or not these divergences are reconcilable, or can be overcome, in 
any long-term agreement for successful integration into and sustaining of a monetary, fiscal, 
and/or banking union.  This will be the primary focus of this paper; to assess the divergences 
between euro member countries that have led to this crisis and determine how and to what 
extent they are divergent.  Only in doing so can we determine what needs to be done to 
establish convergence for the economies of the Eurozone.  It should be noted that the works 
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referenced here comprise only a small portion of the available literature on the Eurozone, as a 
complete and thorough assessment of a more substantial sampling of the available literature 
would occupy this entire thesis.   
Economic Approaches 
As explained earlier, the theory of optimal currency areas originated in 1961 with the 
pioneering work of economist Robert Mundell, who argued in a groundbreaking essay, entitled 
“A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” that certain benefits to a shared currency can 
outweigh the inevitable costs.  On the flip side, however, he is quick to caution that the reverse 
is also possible: that the costs or disadvantages of sharing a currency – whether between 
regions, countries, or continents – can easily outweigh the benefits.  Now, according to 
Mundell7 and others, many are beginning to doubt whether the benefits of a pan-European 
currency union will outweigh the costs in the long term.  
One should note that in his original work on optimal currency areas in 1961, Mundell 
does not specifically outline a currency area as consisting of more than one country; rather, he 
refers to regions that can be either within or outside of a sovereign country.  Indeed, he even 
points out that the very idea of optimal currency areas is (or was at the time of his writing in 
1961), “purely academic, since it hardly appears within the realm of political feasibility that 
national currencies would ever be abandoned in favor of any other arrangement” (Mundell).  It 
is important, when reviewing his work, to remember the world in which he wrote: the Bretton-
                                                          
7
 Mundell, known as a proponent and sometimes as the “Godfather” of EMU, addressed many of these concerns in 
a speech given about his original 1961 treatise on December 5, 1997 at “A Conference on Optimal Currency Areas” 
at Tel Aviv University (Mundell, Speech: Optimum Currency Areas) 
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Woods system of pegged exchange rates was still in effect, the Maastricht Treaty was still over 
three decades away, and the world had not seen serious deregulation in trade barriers and 
international finance that was to come in the years preceding Maastricht.  Additionally, in his 
original work, Mundell calls into question the adaptability of central banks to deal with regional 
shocks in a flexible exchange rate system.  Mundell could not have predicted at the time that 
his pioneering theory would soon become a functioning model for the greatest step toward 
European integration since the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC); in fact, 
he even makes a point of cautioning against an overly aggressive expansion of a currency area.  
He warns in his 1961 paper that too disparate a group of countries in a currency area can 
actually cause economic hardship, but without a practical, real-world application for such a 
scenario at the time, he does not provide a concrete example in his first paper on the subject.  
His was not the only warning that would foreshadow potential troubles for a currency area such 
as the Eurozone. 
Alesina and Barro, in their 2002 paper entitled “Optimal Currency Areas,” examine the 
reality that the number of independent countries in the world is increasing, implying that the 
world is more likely to see more multi-country currency unions as a result.  They undertake a 
fascinating examination of how trade and co-movements of outputs and prices would change in 
the presence of a currency union, and suggest that a country’s decision to join such a union 
would be dependent on these two factors and the way in which joining the union affects them 
(Alesina and Barro).  However, they do not discuss labor productivity and mobility, cultural 
adaptability, overall economic strength, or sector diversification in their analysis; these are all 
important aspects of the European situation that need attention. 
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Jacques de Larosière discusses some of the current problems facing the Eurozone as a 
single currency area in his Occasional Paper No. 84, published by the Group of 30 in July 2012.  
De Larosière is specific about much of what ails the single currency, describing the dichotomy 
that exists between the export-led and mostly industrial economies of Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Austria, and the import-heavy and FDI-dependent service-based economies of 
many of the countries on the periphery of the Eurozone, including Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain (de Larosière).8  Indeed, it is this type of dichotomy that renders a currency 
area susceptible to regional shocks and can result in imbalances in one region exacerbating 
poor macroeconomic conditions in another.  As Mundell writes in his 1961 work, disparate 
economic conditions (such as dramatic differences in GDP per capita, labor mobility and/or 
productivity, etc.), varying levels of development, or differing sector diversification can all 
create conditions that render a currency area less than optimal and exposed to slight changes in 
financial or labor markets. 
De Larosière stresses that the problems with the Eurozone, while originating as 
European issues, have now become global problems in need of a global long-term solution.  
This is a particularly refreshing perspective, especially given the point of view from which it is 
argued.  De Larosière goes on to say that the situation raises serious implications for the rest of 
the industrialized globe from the Eurozone crisis as a sort of case study.  As he states, massive 
national debt is not a problem specific to Europe, but rather to most of the developed world.  
He goes on further to identify fiscal overhangs and imbalances as large factors in the crisis, 
                                                          
8
 These countries are commonly referred to as the “PIIGS” countries after the acronym formed from their names. 
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which not only threaten Europe but the rest of the heavily-indebted industrialized world as 
well. 
So then, does de Larosière see Europe as auguring the potential sovereign debt crises 
that could affect the rest of the developed world also?  Is Europe perhaps the first domino to 
fall, triggered by the uneven impact of a common currency area?9  While de Larosière touches 
briefly on the global implications of policymakers’ responses to the current Eurozone crisis, it is 
vital also to examine the underlying causes of the current crisis, and identify other nations 
where similar trouble might be brewing as a result of those same factors.  He is convinced that 
Europe will remain a dominant player in the global economy, but cautions that the short-term 
challenges facing policymakers in the European Union will dictate both the political and 
economic realities of the next few years. 
De Larosière also pays particular attention to the political realities of policymakers’ 
upcoming decisions regarding both short- and long-term fixes to the Eurozone crisis.  The 
“ultimate question,” according to his paper, is how the adjustment to compensate for economic 
and fiscal divergence amongst members of the Eurozone can be made viable and “politically 
acceptable in the long run.”  By focusing on the long run, de Larosière acknowledges that while 
short-term fixes and political repercussions can and will be messy (exemplified by the recent 
ousters of nearly a dozen incumbent European heads of government), long-term political 
solutions must be made acceptable to the general public.  In saying this, de Larosière insinuates 
that some of these long-term solutions might touch upon long-standing attitudes of inhabitants 
                                                          
9
 In our interview, de Larosière mentioned that, while he sees Europe facing a unique situation, other developed 
economies would do well to learn from some of the challenges that Europe currently faces. 
 Koziara 22 
 
of certain European countries towards inhabitants of others; that is, attitudes that would make 
the general population disinclined to accept long-term policies that might dramatically and 
permanently alter the economic status quo or hierarchy in Europe.  However, in his Occasional 
Paper No. 84, he does not examine specific scenarios among European countries, or the factors 
or arrangements that would render particular hypothetical long-term scenarios either 
acceptable or unacceptable. 
De Larosière’s exposition of the model of a European dichotomy of economies (i.e., 
export-led vs. import-led economies) exposes an interesting question: why was this dichotomy 
not dealt with by policymakers earlier, and why was it not seen by the markets before or during 
the creation and implementation of the Eurozone?  The challenges facing the Eurozone as an 
optimal currency area were discussed at great length by economists and academics both before 
and after the implementation of the European Monetary Union.  However, many of these 
discussions were more theoretical, and lacking in specific scenarios of where the problems of a 
too-divergent system of economies could fail.  Indeed, as previously mentioned, multiple 
experts and economists wrote of the potential economic pitfalls facing the Eurozone back in the 
1990s; however, the general consensus was that the forces of European political integration 
would prevail over any possible economic strain and hold the EMU together.  The Eurozone, 
according to Jacques de Larosière and others, would theoretically move Europe farther than 
ever before from intra-European armed conflict, as it would be inconceivable for a country to 
declare war on a neighbor that shares its currency, with said economies so inextricably linked 
both economically and politically.  Others, such as Harvard economist Martin Feldstein argued, 
on the other hand, that the economic stress to which such a large and economically disparate 
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area as the Eurozone could fall prey would actually make more likely the possibility of another 
armed intra-European conflict, or even conflict with other non-European states (Feldstein).  
This begs the question: in the formation of the Eurozone, was too much weight and credence 
placed on the political accomplishments of Maastricht and European integration, and not 
enough concern given to potential economic or fiscal issues that could be faced by a common 
European currency?  The countries in the Eurozone have changed both economically and 
politically, and the macroeconomic data show that these dynamic and evolving economies do 
not necessarily fit into the Maastricht framework devised under the economic realities of the 
early 1990s, as has been acknowledged by numerous economists.   
Political Approaches and an American Perspective 
The interplay between political and economic drivers for integration into the Eurozone 
has been a subject of great study and debate in the late 1990s, early 2000s, and today.  Robert 
Mundell himself wrote back in 1961 that because currencies themselves are “profound 
expressions of national sovereignty,” any implementation of a common or shared currency 
between countries would have to be accompanied by huge and sweeping political changes 
(Mundell).   
The discussion of sweeping political changes to affect economic change is taken up by 
Bordo & Jonung in their 1999 paper, “The Future of the EMU: What Does the History of 
Monetary Unions Tell Us?”  They discuss many of the hazard areas facing the then-new 
European Monetary Union, and establish some of the key conditions for keeping such unions 
intact.  However, they insist that political factors will be the “central determinants” of the 
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future of the EMU, and that any economic “shortcomings” will be overcome “so long as political 
unity prevails within EMU” (Bordo and Jonung).  However, this begs several important 
questions.  What happens when these political mechanisms become too cumbersome or slow 
to act, or have their hands tied by less-than-favorable economic conditions?  Can political 
paralysis feed into economic conditions as a hazard factor?  While Bordo and Jonung’s 
treatment of institutional political factors is fairly comprehensive, there is little or no discussion 
of some of the more intrinsic economic elements and other political factors that have come to 
affect the Eurozone today, which since the writing of their paper has become essential to 
understanding the current crisis. 
In a similar vein, and demonstrating the political power of currency-sharing agreements, 
Jacques de Larosière uses the example of German unification post-Cold War, and the French 
desire to neutralize the possibility of German dominance.  The answer for the French, of course, 
came in the form of a shared currency, the Euro, between France and Germany; for as de 
Larosière states, “it is very difficult to attack another country that shares your own currency.”  
Hugh Rockoff writes in his 2000 paper, “How Long Did It Take the United States to Become an 
Optimal Currency Area?”, that political considerations can and have historically prevented 
other less-than-optimal currency areas from breaking up, and he singles out the United States 
as a currency area that at one point in its history (that is, before the Great Depression and the 
interstate fiscal transfers that accompanied it) was actually not a functioning optimal currency 
area, but instead, a currency area somewhat similar to the Eurozone of today, with various 
economic sectors dominating certain regions and regional Federal Reserve banks differing on 
how best to solve such problems (Rockoff).  Of course, there is the counterexample of the 
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United States Civil War to prove that political considerations do not always uphold unity 
between areas with economic divergences and differences in sector diversification and 
specialization, such as those of the antebellum North and South.   
The question, then, becomes this: will similar political considerations also hold in 
Europe?  While there will probably be no war similar to the United States Civil War on the 
European Continent anytime soon, past history has dictated a European preference, at least 
thus far, for a model of weaker federalism and stronger national sovereignty.  Do all of the 
considerations from the United States case apply in such a model?  Other historical examples 
presented by Rockoff, along with those given by Bordo and Jonung, consist of entire nations, 
and the Eurozone is an association of nations – does this make a difference?  And, do the 
speed, interconnectivity, and interdependence of today’s international markets and global 
economy allow the time necessary for a less-than-optimal currency area to develop into one?  If 
so, how quickly, and are the above differences likely to exacerbate such a transition even more, 
particularly in the case of Europe?  These are all questions that will be addressed in greater 
detail later. 
What should we make of the United States as a model of an optimal currency area for 
Europe to follow?  Barry Eichengreen, in his 1991 paper entitled “Is Europe an Optimal Currency 
Area?” posits that North America, and the United States in particular, are both much further 
along towards meeting the criteria for an optimal currency area than the countries of the 
European Continent collectively are (Eichengreen).  However, he does not specify how much 
further along in the process the United States is, nor does he spell out what must be done to 
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bring Europe up to speed.  He bases his conclusions upon the idea that the United States has 
both greater labor mobility and a greater speed of labor market adjustment than Europe; 
however, according to much of my research, there are more factors that can determine a 
country’s position in this regard.  Eichengreen examines labor mobility in Europe, and while 
finding it to be higher than most international mobility between other nations, he still finds yet 
a higher level of labor mobility in the United States, presumably because of a common language 
and culture, among other factors. 
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Answer and Method 
 After examining a brief summary of the history of the European Union and the 
Eurozone, and what has led to the current situation, and also after assessing much of the 
previous work on the subject, this thesis will now lay out several key arguments.  The first is 
that, regardless of its original design or the economic realities surrounding its birth, the 
Eurozone is not currently functioning as an optimal currency area.  This does not disqualify the 
zone, however, from meeting such criteria in the future, and suggestions will be given as to how 
that might become a reality.  Based on current macroeconomic conditions and differences 
between countries in the current Eurozone, then, an optimal currency area in present-day 
Europe would either be smaller and more homogenous than the current Eurozone, more 
closely integrated than the current Eurozone, or both.  Insofar as homogeneity is concerned, 
various measures or types of homogeneity could be applicable, depending on the combination 
of states.  Economic homogeneity and some level of macroeconomic convergence is clearly 
most important; however, one should not rule out increased political or cultural homogeneity 
as powerful forces that could also contribute to holding together an optimal currency area. 
 In discussing a more closely integrated Eurozone, this paper will examine processes that 
the Eurozone could follow and pursue to become more optimal over time, the membership of 
the current Eurozone remaining the same.  As hinted at earlier, such a process has been 
undertaken successfully in the past by the United States, and is certainly not out of the realm of 
imagination.  However, one must examine the realities of the economic and political strains 
that would accompany such a process, particularly in today’s fast-paced and interconnected 
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global economy, and examine whether those costs are worth the benefits, particularly given 
other objectives for European integration.  While it is likely that political considerations and 
realities will win out, as Bordo and Jonung posit in their paper, the path to reaching an optimal 
currency area in Europe is less clear. 
 What method, then, will this paper use to examine the current situation in the 
Eurozone?  How will it assess the current issues with the common currency and the Eurozone, 
and what could be done to fix them?  The answer lies in a careful review and comparison of 
various data.  Analysis of several key metrics will allow us the opportunity to examine economic 
divergences amongst the member states of the Eurozone, from GDP per capita to labor 
productivity to inflation and interest rates.  It is important to note that this paper will focus 
mostly on the changes in these metrics: the convergence or divergence between Eurozone 
countries indicated by the various changes in these metrics over time.  Interest rate 
divergences, mediated by progress on short-term funding problems, will be analyzed as 
symptoms of the crisis, and used to corroborate evidence presented in other economic 
measurements. 
 This analysis will not be limited to a strictly quantitative examination of the Eurozone, 
however.  Fiscal and monetary data and examples will be utilized in a more qualitative and 
comparative fashion to examine some of the effects of differing political and economic systems, 
and comparisons with the United States and its history in becoming an optimal currency area 
will also be utilized to demonstrate several key points. 
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Data and Arguments 
Since Maastricht: How Did the Eurozone Get to Where It Is Today? 
 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), originally proposed by German Finance Minister 
Theo Waigel and fully realized in the late 1990s, was intended to keep European states from 
exerting excess inflationary pressures on the entire European economy, by maintaining fiscal 
discipline amongst the members of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  Its purpose was 
two-fold: to bring the economies of countries that would comprise the Eurozone into 
convergence before the adoption of the common currency, and to maintain compliance with 
the Pact’s criteria post-implementation of the Eurozone.  The criteria for convergence, as 
outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, are as follows: 
1. That the 12-month average of yearly rates of inflation should not exceed, in any 
member country, the unweighted arithmetic average of the three lowest member 
states’ rates of inflation, plus 1.5%;  
2. That each member state’s annual government budget deficit should not exceed 3% of 
the member state’s gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of the previous fiscal year, 
and the government’s gross debt-to-GDP ratio should not exceed 60% in any given year; 
3. That the member state should join the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) under the 
European Monetary System (EMS), and shall have managed to maintain its currency 
within a +/-15% range of a central, fixed rate of exchange;  
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4. That the long-term interest rate should not exceed, for any member country, the 
unweighted arithmetic average of the interest rates of the three member states with 
lowest inflation, plus 2%.  
While there are exceptions to each of these general rules outlined in the Stability and Growth 
Pact for extreme circumstances or outliers in the data, the purpose of these criteria was to 
bring Eurozone member and candidate countries into closer economic convergence.  Fines and 
other punitive measures were intended for those member states that violated the SGP.  
However, the absence of a clear system of enforcement, along with a lack of willingness to 
enforce the criteria through the use of punitive measures (particularly against large countries 
such as France and Germany when they violated the criteria in the early 2000s) led to a general 
breakdown and ineffectiveness of the Pact.  Additionally, according to Jacques de Larosière, the 
relative looseness of the criteria allowed countries to utilize budgetary gimmicks and 
accounting procedures to mask government deficits in excess of 3% per year.  Many have 
argued that the Pact did not go far enough, either on detail or enforcement, to prevent 
member states from abusing and/or failing to meet and maintain the convergence criteria.  
Further “uneven” enforcement of the Pact strained tensions in several European countries as 
well.10 
 Enter the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008.  While it is not the focus of this paper 
to examine the causes or events of the financial crisis, what is important to the current 
situation in the Eurozone is the manner in which European governments responded to it.  While 
                                                          
10
 Punitive proceedings for violations of the Stability and Growth Pact were started against Portugal in 2002 and 
against Greece in 2005; however, these never resulted in fines for those states. 
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there were, and remain to this day, differing opinions on the techniques utilized by European 
governments in response to the crisis, many economists, including Jacques de Larosière, argue 
that an unprecedented level of fiscal stimulus, monetary expansion by central banks, and 
institutional bailouts of banks prevented the crisis from becoming much worse.  Crucial to an 
understanding of the current crisis, however, is how the responses of various European 
governments differed, along with their respective effects. 
 We must first examine the preparedness and ability of European governments to sustain 
large fiscal stimuli; that is, how leveraged these governments already were at the outbreak of 
the financial crisis.  Keeping in mind that the criteria set forth by the Stability and Growth Pact 
mandated a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio “ceiling” for sovereign debts, the debt-to-GDP ratios at the 
time of the outbreak of the financial crisis can be found in the following chart. 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix C for 
further detail on debt ratios by country and year.) 
Note that with the exception of Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain, all of the countries shown 
above were already in violation of the original Stability and Growth Pact by 2007, having 
allowed their debt-to-GDP ratio to grow in excess of 60%.  Those countries shown that were not 
already in violation would later see their debt-to-GDP ratio balloon to above 60% within a very 
short period of time, as we can see from the next figure. 
 It is important to understand, using the chart above as a reference point, that various 
countries in the Eurozone were in differing positions with regard to their national debt and 
fiscal overhangs when the financial crisis hit.  Germany and France, both with relatively strong 
credit ratings compared later to Greece, Italy and Portugal, were in a position, along with the 
other “export-oriented” countries of Austria and the Netherlands, to sustain largely 
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other hand, were already bearing public debts in excess of 90%, the generally-agreed threshold 
at which debt hampers economic growth.  These nations were not as fit to undertake massive 
fiscal stimulus as Germany and others were. 
 What should we make of Ireland and Spain’s relatively low public debts shown here?  
One must keep in mind that the crises in these countries were caused by private debt bubbles, 
which burst shortly after the global financial crisis hit.  Also, the construction booms and private 
credit expansion in these countries had led to large public revenues, and thus, these countries 
had been able, at least in part, to keep their national debt in check. 
 What happened as these governments began to respond to the financial crisis with 
increased fiscal stimulus?  We can see the growth of government debt year-over-year below. 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix C for 
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 So, then, how would this massive public debt be financed?  A variety of lenders were 
utilized, including private and central banks of various European nations.  When the financial 
crisis of 2007-08 hit the Eurozone, many of these same countries, which had already incurred 
substantial debt positions (as a percentage of GDP), went further into debt to provide for 
increased fiscal stimulus, following the model of Germany, which increased public spending to 
ease the effects of the financial crisis on their economy.  However, not all of the nations of the 
Eurozone had the financial stewardship of Germany over their public finances, and most were 
more deeply indebted.  When it finally became apparent in the summer of 2010 that Greece 
had an unsustainable public debt, the markets reacted and Greek interest rates went through 
the roof (see Appendix B for more detail), soon to be followed by those of the other countries 
on the periphery with similar near-unsustainable public finances.  The chickens of the massive 
economic divergences between these countries had come home to roost. 
Monetary Union or Amalgamation of States? 
 Before examining the key data and metrics, it is important to take a step back and 
examine some of the key differences between the countries that comprise the Eurozone.  
Critical to this examination is the composition of the economies of these states, as well as key 
differences in political structures, institutions, and attitudes at each national level. 
 One of the key criteria for evaluating whether or not a group of regions, or countries, 
comprises an optimal currency area is whether or not they have similar business cycles; that is, 
whether or not they move relatively in sync and experience similar shocks and growth rates.  
This concurrence would be expected to entail relative similarity in the composition of the 
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economies of the states in question, insofar as diversification of industries and sectors is 
concerned.  It can be argued, based on the following data, that the sector diversification of 
several members of the Eurozone shown below is not homogeneous enough to result in similar 
business cycles.  Indeed, as they are commonly grouped, and as has been mentioned earlier in 
this paper, on one hand are the industrial and export-oriented countries of Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Austria; on the other, the import-led, service-based economies of Greece, 
Italy, and the other countries on the periphery of the Continent.  The divergence amongst 
percentages of the labor force employed in each sector, as shown below, would seem to 
indicate broad economic divergence amongst these states. 
 
(Data from the CIA World Factbook.11  See Appendix D for further detail on percentages of labor 
force by sector.)12 
                                                          
11
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2048.html#gm (Central Intelligence Agency) 
12
 It should be noted that the European Union, and not the Eurozone, is used for reference in this chart.  Only data 
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 We can also examine differences in the composition of the GDP of each of the same 
countries, although these differences are not as pronounced as the preceding ones. 
 
(Data from the CIA World Factbook.  See Appendix D for further detail on percentages of GDP in 
each sector.) 
 One should note that while agriculture comprises a statistically significant percentage of 
the labor force in some of the countries above, it nonetheless represents a rather small portion 
of each country’s GDP.  The charts above and below also indicate some significant differences 
between the allocation of GDP to certain sectors of the economies of these states as compared 
to the allocation of labor force to these same sectors, most particularly in Greece and Portugal.  
While some difference in this regard would be normal for non-traded goods, it is productivity 
differences that cause cost differences, and these cost differences in turn cause market value 
differences, leading to differences in allocation of GDP to certain sectors of the economies of 
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particular the gap between GDP and labor force percentages in the service sector13 in the cases 
of Greece and Portugal.
 
(Data from the CIA World Factbook.  N.B. This chart includes data on both the European Union14 
and the United States to use as reference point for the other data.  See Appendix D for further 
detail on percentages of GDP and labor force comprising each sector.) 
 So, then, if these differences exist, do they suggest differences in labor productivity 
between various sectors of each nation’s economy?  For example, is the labor force in Greece’s 
service sector more productive than those in its industrial and agricultural sectors, compared to 
                                                          
13
 The service sector was chosen for use in this graphic and for inclusion in the body of the text because it is the 
sector with the largest differences between percentage of GDP and percentage of the labor force involved in that 
sector.  Similar complementary differences can be found in a comparison of the GDP vs. labor force involved in the 
non-service sectors of the economy (industry and agriculture); however, as some of these differences are spread 
over those two sectors, the author has chosen to use the service sector to illustrate this theoretical exercise.  The 
large differences for Greece and Portugal displayed in the graphic above are largely the result of opposite 
divergences in the agricultural sector; see Appendix D for more information.  
14
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the same labor forces in equivalent sectors of another Eurozone country?  Regardless of the 
answer to this question, which would be beyond the scope of this paper, the divergences 
between countries with regard to economic sector diversification and composition, coupled 
with the differences between the percentage of GDP vs. labor force comprising each sector 
(and the absence of any similarity or convergent trend among all the countries of the Eurozone 
in this regard), could indicate either that there is a general, overall divergence between 
Eurozone economies in productivity and efficiency.  An alternative explanation for the 
differences in numbers and percentages above is that these divergences are the result of 
Eurozone economies that are not experiencing in the same business cycles; that is to say that 
the composition of these national economies by industry and by sector is so different that 
figures and data pertaining to the efficiency of certain parts of the work force would be 
different across these countries as well.  Either way, both explanations would indicate, either 
alone or in combination with each other, large-scale divergences of significance between the 
countries of the Eurozone in regards to composition of their economies.  Such large-scale 
divergences would make it more difficult for countries to share similar business cycles, and this 
undermines some key criteria for an optimal currency area: relatively similar economies and 
shared (or relatively similar) business cycles. 
Political Differences and Cultural Barriers 
 Varying political attitudes between states are also relevant to our analysis of key 
differences between the members of the Eurozone.  While many national and cultural 
stereotypes do exist between each nation on the Continent, there are real perceptions and 
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attitudes (at times, antipathy) towards other member states or heads of governments.  One 
need not look further than the slightly-less-than-warm reception of German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel in November 2012 in Portugal by demonstrators, or the assault on one of her diplomats 
by an angry crowd of protestors earlier in the year in Greece, as examples of high passions 
enflamed by the crisis (Evans-Pritchard).  The recent success of anti-austerity candidates and 
parties in elections in both Italy and France have also sent a strong shock wave and have been 
widely interpreted as a message against German demands for harsh fiscal discipline. 
 To a certain extent, these differing political attitudes and perceptions have revealed 
themselves in the wide-ranging negotiations to achieve short-term fixes and agree to structural 
changes and reforms within the Eurozone.  The decisions of June 29, 2012 were fraught with 
German reluctance to agree to certain forms of assistance to deal with the crisis, and this 
reluctance was due at least in part to perceptions that the countries of the periphery (the so-
called “PIIGS” countries) are irresponsible with their fiscal policies and do not engage in the 
same type of strict fiscal discipline as practiced by Germany.  Whether or not these perceptions 
are grounded in fact is another story, and the reader can make his or her own deductions here 
based on the relative strength of both the German and peripheral economies as they currently 
stand. 
 Some of these differences in political attitudes, however, are also historic, dating back 
to the last two-plus centuries of war and conflict in Europe.  As Martin Feldstein notes in his 
paper “EMU and International Conflict,” France in particular sees the European Union as a tool 
with which to stem potential German hegemony over the Continent and insure French 
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influence as well; this concern is grounded in the past wars and political conflicts between the 
French and German states.  British reluctance to join the Eurozone can be seen as an extension 
of Britain’s historical hesitance to involve itself too deeply with the affairs of the Continent; 
being an island nation has permitted it in the past to stay out of many conflicts on the 
Continent.  While Britain also enjoys (and has enjoyed, historically) its own rather advanced and 
sophisticated financial system and capital markets, with the current process of integration in 
the European Union and the Eurozone, those countries which are unwilling to participate will 
end up the losers economically, creating for themselves a type of economic isolation, or a 
certain “autarky” (Feldstein).  It can be contended, however, that Britain’s separate currency 
has prevented it too from being dragged down into the Eurozone crisis and assisted in 
maintaining some semblance of economic stability and order in Europe. 
 Cultural differences between European countries serve as a major roadblock to Europe 
as an optimal currency area, along with the political attitudes between countries.  Because of 
these cultural differences, which include language, work customs, length of the workweek, 
differences in punctuality, family life and its relation to professional life, different forms and 
institutions of government, and many others, labor mobility between countries is unsurprisingly 
lower in Europe and the Eurozone than it is in an optimal currency area such as the United 
States.  While there is very little data to corroborate this claim,  and per Barry Eichengreen, 
“direct evidence on the extent of interregional labor mobility is hard to obtain,” (Eichengreen), 
he points out in his 1991 paper one particular systematic comparison published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1986, that, while dated, 
concludes that labor mobility within the United States was two to three times higher than labor 
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mobility in Europe (OECD, 1986).  While this gap has probably shrunk due to increased 
economic integration with the advent of the Eurozone, considerations of cultural differences 
and unwillingness to cede national sovereignty, whether on a personal or state level, would 
seem to indicate that labor mobility in the Eurozone is still lagging behind that of the United 
States, and probably behind that which is necessary to meet the criteria for an optimal currency 
area in regards to labor flexibility. 
Current Account Divergence amongst Eurozone Countries 
 As one examines the key macroeconomic indicators and statistics related to divergence 
in the Eurozone, it is important to examine the divergence amongst countries’ current account 
balances.  One of the most important indicators of whether or not a country is living within its 
means is its balance of trade, which comprises a large, crucial component of a country’s current 
account, or the surplus or deficit of trade in goods and services exported from and imported 
into a country each year.  In assessing the divergence amongst Eurozone countries, one finds 
that the more industrial, export-leading “core” countries of the Eurozone, particularly Germany, 
but also including the Netherlands, Austria, and France, have on the whole improved their 
current account positions substantially (and dramatically in the case of Germany) over the 
lifespan of the Eurozone thus far.  France appears to deviate from the trend set by the other 
core countries in regards to its current account, however: its relatively modest deficit of its 
current account would seem to indicate a lack of competitiveness, which could and should be 
ameliorated, according to Jacques de Larosière. 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix E for 
further detail on current account data by country and by year.)15 
Whereas the current account positions of these countries improved over the period leading 
from Maastricht (and the implementation of the Eurozone in 1999-2002) until recently, during 
the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, the current account positions of some of the 
Eurozone’s peripheral members, such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, have fallen, 
as is evidenced in the chart below. 
                                                          
15
 France is excluded from this chart, as its data in regards to the current account balance classifies it as an outlier 






































































































 Koziara 43 
 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix E for 
further detail on current account data by country and by year.) 
Note that with the exception of Italy, all of these countries’ current account positions began to 
improve around 2008-2009, at the time that the sovereign debt crisis hit.16  The deficits during 
the 1999-2008 period, however, viewed together with the current account surplus exhibited by 
the export-leading “core” countries above, would seem to indicate a net outflow of exports 
from the core countries and a net inflow of imports into the countries of the periphery.  These 
goods and services had to be paid for, however, as, countries around the periphery amassed a 
                                                          
16
 It is worth mentioning that this improvement in the current account positions of indicated countries (that is to 
say, moving towards surplus) was more a result of a fall in spending on imports due to the global recession rather 
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large quantity of both public and private debt over the same period.  Such a divergence of 
import versus export levels demonstrates that the economies of the core, “export-led” 
countries were not in sync with those on the periphery, and calls into question the 
homogeneity of the Eurozone from the perspective of an optimal currency area.  Indeed, 
Germany itself moved from having one of the largest current account deficits in 1994, shortly 
after its reunification, to having the largest current account surplus in the mid- to late-2000s.  
This monumental shift in the current account positions of Germany versus some of the other 
countries in the Eurozone, would seem to indicate substantial divergence among these 
countries’ overall macroeconomic positions. 
 The countries of the Eurozone, as has previously been mentioned, had begun for several 
years to amass large public debts (enabling the current account to run a deficit every year in 
certain countries), and this pattern of annual budget deficits only increased with the increased 
public spending to provide for fiscal stimulus in reaction to the 2007-08 global financial crisis.  
For clearer demonstration of this point, and of the yearly deficits that began to underlay the 
massive government debts described earlier in this paper, refer to the graph below. 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix F for 
further detail on surplus/deficit data by country and by year.) 
A closer look separately at the yearly deficits of countries of the periphery and the “core” 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix F for 
further detail on surplus/deficit data by country and by year.) 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  N.B. The “PIIGS” 
Average comprises an unweighted arithmetic mean of the annual surplus/deficit-to-GDP ratio of 
the countries of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, and is included here solely for 
reference.  See Appendix F for further detail on surplus/deficit data by country and by year.) 
To create a clearer picture, see below the averages of the annual government budget surpluses 
and deficits of the countries of the periphery (the “PIIGS” countries17) versus the “core” 
countries in the Eurozone.18  Note that during the years 2007-2012, the unweighted average of 
the deficits run by the countries of the periphery is over twice that of the “core” countries in 
the Eurozone.  Such a difference clearly indicates macroeconomic divergence, and will 
undoubtedly have detrimental effects on the efforts of a state’s government to keep its 
                                                          
17
 “PIIGS” is an acronym of common usage including the countries of the periphery; that is, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece, and Spain.  It is found several times throughout this paper and is utilized for the sake of convenience and 
clarity.  The author does not intend its use to be taken as derogatory. 
18
 For purposes of this paper, “core” countries includes the more export-led countries of Germany, Austria, the 
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economy in sync with those of the rest of the currency area.  Although most states are now 
shrinking their yearly budget deficits, the debt accumulated over several years of such large 
deficits now threatens the solvency and future growth of these governments and their 
economies, respectively. 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  Averages consist of 
the unweighted arithmetic mean of the surpluses/deficits of the five “PIIGS” countries of 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, and of the four “core” countries of Germany, Austria, 
the Netherlands, and France, which are used throughout this paper.  See Appendix F for further 
detail on surplus/deficit data by country and by year.) 
 
GDP Growth Divergences 
It is also important to note changes in gross domestic product (GDP) during the period 
discussed thus far.  As GDP is viewed both as an indicator of a country’s standard of living and 
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capita for the member states of the Eurozone permits an analysis of growth patterns or 
divergences in these metrics.  Indeed, a look at growth or decline in GDP per capita, assuming 
constant prices,19 demonstrates tangible and significant divergences in growth amongst Euro 
member states; in the case of the difference between Germany and Italy, this gap is nearly 17 
percentage points over the 2002-2011 period. 
Change in GDP per capita, 2002-2011 
Country 2002 2011 
% 
Change 
Austria 32306.477 36131.136 11.84% 
France 28668.214 29938.053 4.43% 
Germany 30658.694 34580.83 12.79% 
Greece 21757.745 22287.413 2.43% 
Ireland 35758.035 37210.02 4.06% 
Italy 28253.97 27081.473 -4.15% 
Netherlands 33894.122 37119.365 9.52% 
Portugal 21438.681 21414.419 -0.11% 
Spain 26095.389 26981.212 3.39% 
Euro area 28523.301 30166.827 5.76% 
*Prices given in USD, assuming constant prices.  Source: OECD 
In examining the changes in GDP per capita over the 2002-11 (once again assuming constant 
prices to minimize the effects of differing rates of inflation on our data), we see a broad variety 
of movement, both growth and shrinkage, throughout the ten year period: 
                                                          
19
 For the purposes of this paper, the author has chosen to use GDP per capita assuming constant prices, given the 
differing levels of inflation in some Eurozone countries during the 2002-11 period and the potential for them to 
skew the results.  Utilizing constant prices paints a more accurate picture of real GDP growth and/or decline. 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix G for 
further detail on GDP per capita by country and year.) 
In order to more closely examine the trends of the “core” countries versus those on the 
periphery, here are two separate charts demonstrating the growth or decline of each country’s 
GDP per capita.  Notice the growth in all of the “core” countries, as well as the Eurozone as a 
whole, contrasted with the stagnant or low growth in most of the countries on the periphery.  It 
is also significant that the “core” countries seem to have only experienced one year of decline 
in GDP per capita, between 2008-09, whereas most of the countries of the periphery 
experienced a decline in GDP per capita beginning in 2007 and continuing either until 2009 or 
2010, depending on the country.  None of these countries has yet recovered fully to the GDP 
per capita levels that they enjoyed before 2007, in contrast to Austria and Germany, which 
have both recovered and now boast higher GDP per capita than they did before 2008.  The 
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heavier toll on the economies of the periphery, hampering their economic output as reflected 
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It is important here, after an examination of both current accounts and GDP growth (per capita) 
in the member states of the Eurozone, to bring up a point emphasized by Marina von Neumann 
Whitman in her essay on place prosperity and optimum policy areas (Whitman).  She states, as 
can be observed in the case of these countries, that the growth process is not always trade 
neutral; that is to say that the output and input elasticities of supply and demand can create 
either an export-biased or import-biased growth.  In these scenarios, the current account 
changes as export bias leads to a surplus (as was enjoyed by Germany and many of the “core” 
countries in the early 2000s) or as import bias leads to a deficit (as was borne by many of the 
countries on the periphery at the same time, as evidenced by the current account data 
presented earlier in this paper).  Even with uniform rates of inflation (which the Eurozone 
certainly did not enjoy, as will be demonstrated next), it is extremely difficult to maintain 
external balance amongst the states involved in such a scenario (Whitman). 
Divergences in Labor Productivity 
 Divergences in labor productivity among the member states of the Eurozone indicate 
yet another aspect of economic non-convergence.  It would seem, according to Jacques de 
Larosière and others, that countries sharing a common currency should maintain a similar level 
of labor productivity; for if they do not, then there is no action that a central bank or other 
monetary authority can undertake to alleviate these differences.  Compare this to a case where 
a country that possessed slightly lower labor productivity would allow its currency to depreciate 
in order to compensate for the difference, according to Mundell’s original model in his 1961 
paper (Mundell).  De Larosière points out in particular the slight difference in labor productivity 
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between France and Germany (that France lags Germany ever-so-slightly in labor productivity) 
and the resultant current account imbalances between the two as an example of France’s need 
for structural reforms to regain competitiveness and a better external balance. 
 How large, then, are the differences in labor productivity between Eurozone member 
states?  The graphics below provide a point of reference.  Note the wide divergences between 
the “periphery” countries, as was already exemplified by their varying experiences with the 
sovereign debt crisis, versus the relatively uniform patterns of shifts in labor productivity 
experienced by the “core” countries. 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix H for 
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And for a clearer set of data, from which one can examine similarities and differences in labor 
productivity changes: 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix H for 
more detail by country and year.) 
Note that the countries of the periphery, shown below, display much less homogeneity in the 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix H for 
more detail by country and year.) 
It is also useful, in a simple analysis of the data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, to look at the overall changes in labor productivity for each of the countries 
from the period spanning 2006-2013, and also for the period spanning 1999-2013.  Key 
divergences exist in each set of data, to the tune of over 14 percentage points (between Ireland 
and Italy) and 35 percentage points (also between Ireland and Italy), respectively. 
This once again begs the question: how can macroeconomic convergence, and the 
criteria of wage flexibility and labor mobility, be achieved amongst countries which exhibit such 
divergences in changes in labor productivity?  If wages were truly flexible and labor truly mobile 
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were reached20), then would not the changes in labor productivity be equal, or at least closer to 
equal, for all countries shown here? 
Inflation 
 Another metric can be utilized to demonstrate that the economies of the Eurozone are 
not achieving the convergence required to form an optimal currency area will be rates of 
inflation.  Theoretically, one would assume that across a currency area of some level of 
homogeneity, or an optimal currency area, the degree of inflation year-to-year would be 
relatively homogeneous between member states.  However, an analysis of the following sets of 
data demonstrates otherwise for the Eurozone: 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix I for 
more detail by country and year.) 
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Note the wide band of inflation statistics in the above graph; the divergence between inflation 
rates of the “core” countries is not as great: 
 
(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix I for 
more detail by country and year.) 
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(Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  See Appendix I for 
more detail by country and year.) 
 
Divergence in Unemployment Rates 
 There is a final key indicator that displays the macroeconomic divergence among 
member states of the Eurozone: divergences in the unemployment rates of these countries, or 
unemployment dispersion.  Changes in unemployment rates can be indicative of economic 
shocks, and can accompany changes in the business cycle, in addition to the relationship 
between unemployment and inflation.  Widespread divergence in the unemployment rates of 
countries sharing a common currency would seem to also indicate a lack of macroeconomic 
convergence as well. 
In an article for the Council on Foreign Relations, Benn Steil and Dinah Walker examine 
trends in divergence of unemployment rates between the United States and the countries of 
the Eurozone.  They compare the unemployment dispersion in the United States (that is, the 
range between the highest and lowest unemployment rates by state) with the unemployment 
dispersion between countries in the Eurozone (Steil and Walker).  The chart found in their 
article is particularly telling, and presents graphic evidence of the differences between the 
United States and the Eurozone in regards to progress made towards convergence and 
optimization of a currency area. 
Note that during the period between 2000-2008, unemployment dispersion in the 
United States maintained a relatively constant level of just under 5%, whereas that of the 
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Eurozone was much more pronounced over that same period.  While it is important to note 
that it appears that the countries of the Eurozone were making progress on bringing their 
unemployment rates into convergence with one another over this period (dropping from a 10% 
difference in 2000 to just over 5% in 2008, the differences among the highest and lowest 
unemployment rates skyrocketed after the global financial crisis of 2007-08, and climbed 
further throughout the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  While the unemployment dispersion 
also increased in the United States following the global financial crisis of 2007-08, it has since 
recovered to near pre-2009 levels. 
(It should be noted that the 2005 spike in U.S. unemployment dispersion is due to the 
effects of Hurricane Katrina.) 
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 These differences between the United States and the Eurozone may be indicative of a 
behavior of the Eurozone to act and function at least somewhat like an optimal currency area 
during periods of relative economic stability, but a general inability to weather economic shocks 
as an OCA.  This may be partially a result, in this particular case, of a lack of coordination among 
policymakers of the Eurozone during the recent financial crisis of 2007-08 and the sovereign 
debt crises, and a relative inability to enact effective, centralized measures along the lines of 
those pursued by the federal government of the United States in response to these economic 
shocks and crises.  Such a difference indicates that in order for the Eurozone to become an 
OCA, structural and institutional changes will need to be made to give policymakers better 
coordinating abilities and a centralized response to such shocks (in addition to changes 
designed to bring the member states of the Eurozone into closer macroeconomic convergence). 
On a Case-by-Case Basis: What Caused the Crisis? 
What, then, allowed this pattern of economic divergence and the dichotomy of export-
led versus import-driven economies to continue for so many years under the euro?  In order to 
get a satisfactory answer, it is necessary to examine several of the countries of the Eurozone 
individually, as each country’s issues and underlying causes of their sovereign debt crisis are 
slightly different.  As there was no single template for each crisis, neither is there a “one-size-
fits-all” solution to be found. 
Greece  
Greece, viewed by many as the initial flashpoint for the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone, had actually enjoyed one of the fastest rates of growth in the Eurozone throughout 
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the early and mid 2000s, after having adopted the euro in 2001.  However, this growth came at 
the expense of a large structural deficit in the country’s public finances, and two of its most 
important sectors, shipping and tourism, were highly sensitive to changes in the business cycle.  
When the global financial crisis struck in 2007-08, these two sectors were particularly badly hit, 
and Greek government spending increased in an attempt to compensate for the economic 
losses.  The Greek government was already in debt to the tune of 115% of the country’s GDP, as 
can be seen from the earlier chart on government debt as a percentage of GDP, and very 
quickly found itself running out of money with which to cover its expenses, the most notable of 
which were Greece’s high public sector wages and pension commitments. 
 When the Greek government realized in April 2010 that it would not be able to cover its 
expenses for the remainder of the year, it requested a €45 billion loan from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), leading to a downgrade by several credit ratings agencies and fears in 
international markets.  A further request for €110 billion, to finance Greek government 
expenses for three years, came in May 2010, and along with it came plans for austerity 
measures to rein in the country’s out-of-control public spending.  Further loans and structured 
austerity plans elicited riots, protests, and tensions between the government and Greece’s 
citizenry, with widespread vilification by protestors of other European nations, the IMF, and 
others.  As interest rates on Greek bonds soared, owing to plummeting investor confidence, so 
too did Greece’s borrowing costs, and the need for additional bailout funds became apparent.  
An additional €130 billion loan from the Troika (EU, ECB, and IMF) was agreed to later in 
February 2011, in exchange for a rigorous austerity regime.  While Greece is finally on the path 
to becoming once again financially solvent, the road ahead remains perilous, and additional 
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assistance may still be necessary.  Greece’s government deficit for 2013 is under 5% and 
shrinking – a manageable number – but its public debt will remain high for the foreseeable 
future, stunting economic growth, and with it, any potential ability to pay it off more quickly.  
Ireland 
In Ireland, the causes of the debt crisis were different than in Greece.  High public 
spending was not the problem; rather, Ireland’s government enjoyed surpluses for the years 
leading up to the global financial crisis in 2007-08.  A massive construction and property boom, 
financed through private credit (with bank deposit insurance from the government) led to 
higher public receipts and increased public spending during the middle part of the first decade 
of the new century.  According to Jacques de Larosière, it was only when access to private 
credit dried up during the global financial crisis that this construction boom faltered.  With 
massive defaults by property owners and a drop of 47% in housing values,21 Ireland’s major 
banks lost tens of billions of euros in deposits, and the central bank moved to insure these 
deposits.  When major bank withdrawals accelerated, in conjunction with the huge drop in 
public receipts as a result of the bursting of the construction bubble, the Irish government 
quickly found itself in a liquidity crisis, and unable to sustain its budget.  One need only refer to 
the year-to-year government deficit charts in this paper to understand how dramatically and 
how quickly this crisis unfolded.  Ireland’s deficit spending, in its attempt to stem the effects of 
its construction bubble bursting, was quickly recognized by the markets as unsustainable, 
although its case is not as severe as Greece’s. 
                                                          
21
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ei.html 
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Italy 
Italy occupies a unique position in the drama unfolding in the Eurozone crisis.  It is the 
third-largest economy in the Eurozone, and as such, has been watched carefully by investors for 
signs of financial turmoil.  However, according to Professor Lucia Tajoli of the Politecnico di 
Milano, the Eurozone crisis has not so much caused or inflamed economic strains in Italy as 
much as it has simply exposed already-existing economic and political issues.  Professor Tajoli 
emphasizes that Italian banks have not been subjected to the contagion that has affected their 
Spanish and Irish counterparts, largely owing to their overall more-conservative practices and 
sound financial systems.  While Italian government debt remains high at over 120% of GDP, it 
was over 115% even prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and the start of European 
sovereign debt contagion.  Italy is also on track to have a government surplus this upcoming 
year, and its deficits have not exceeded 5% of GDP throughout the crisis; this indicates that 
Italy’s net balanced position will keep it solvent for now.  Professor Tajoli notes that Italian 
banks have never been as profitable as their foreign counterparts because they have not taken 
on as risky assets, and have therefore passed stress tests quite easily (Tajoli).22  She also points 
out the large private Italian wealth levels, and Italy’s standing as the Eurozone’s third-largest 
economy, which, along with lower bond yields, have assured and assuaged the fears of many 
investors.   
One of the largest causes of uncertainty regarding Italy’s financial positions remains its 
national politics.  As recent elections in February 2013 have shown, Italian elections can be 
                                                          
22
 It should be noted that while helping Italy to avoid similar crises to those in the other countries of the periphery, 
the more conservative nature of Italian banks makes it much more difficult to easily obtain capital for new 
initiatives, which could hamper new growth. 
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unpredictable and heavily influenced by public reactions to the Eurozone crisis and the 
austerity program championed by the technocratic government of Mario Monti.  Indeed, the 
Monti government was originally ushered in by a dramatic and sweeping hand-off of power 
from former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in a bid to restore international confidence in 
Italian bonds.  While the reforms enacted by the Monti government will have a negative effect 
on short-term growth because of the austerity measures they include, the fiscal consolidation, 
bureaucratic consolidation, and labor pension reform policies put into place will begin to have 
effects in the near term and should result in modest but positive effect on long-term growth 
(Tajoli). 
Portugal 
 The case of Portugal was similar to that of Greece: overspending in the public sector and 
a fragile but over-bureaucratized financial system within the government.  Portugal’s economy 
was teetering along before the global financial crisis, and following the US credit crisis and the 
contagion and disruption of markets caused by the Greek credit downgrades earlier in 2010, 
Portugal’s finances were quickly moving out of control.  Credit ratings agencies cut Portugal’s 
sovereign debt rating in the summer of 2010, and by early 2011, the country was petitioning 
the Troika for €78 billion in bailout funds in order to stabilize government finances.  It should be 
noted that structural reforms were quickly enacted, with considerably less public opposition 
and protest than in Greece (where the government excess affected more than just overpaid 
bureaucrats), and it appears, as shown in the graphs and charts earlier in this paper, that 
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Portugal is on track to begin to move to government surpluses and chip away at its national 
debt within the next few years.23 
Spain 
 Spain found itself in a similar position to that of Ireland before the global financial crisis.  
In fact, Ireland and Spain account for the two lowest pre-2007-08 debt-to-GDP ratios of all of 
the countries discussed in this paper, even Germany.  Like Ireland, Spain experienced a housing 
bubble in the early- to mid-2000s, and this bubble accounted for high public receipts, and thus 
much lower debt, than many of Spain’s Eurozone counterparts.  When the housing bubble 
burst, Spanish banks found themselves in a position similar to those in Ireland, and the Spanish 
government commenced a program to bail out the most vulnerable banks.  This enormous 
government spending program drew into question the solvency of the Spanish government, 
and although Spain passed an amendment to its constitution to require balanced government 
budgets by 2020, along with other fiscal restraint measures, Spain’s debt was still downgraded, 
and the country sought Troika assistance in early 2012.  Spain was and remains a particular 
concern for investors, as its size accounts for more than Ireland, Portugal, and Greece 
combined (it is the fourth-largest economy in the Eurozone), and the failure or default of a 
government of such size would have catastrophic rippling effects on the entire Eurozone. 
In examining the accounts of each of the five “PIIGS” countries and their individual 
experiences with the Eurozone crisis, it is apparent that no country among them is exactly the 
same.  While there may be some similarities, this is still indicative of widespread divergence 
                                                          
23
 It should also be noted that Portugal’s national debt is currently around 130% of GDP, considerably less than 
that of Greece. 
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amongst the economies of the periphery.  If these economies are going through such divergent 
cycles of experience amongst themselves (and not to mention the divergences between these 
countries of the periphery and the “core”), then how can one argue that the countries of the 
Eurozone are convergent from a macroeconomic perspective, and thus, currently comprise an 
optimal currency area? 
How to Solve the Problems of Divergence? 
 Is the Eurozone worth saving?  That is, should the countries of the Eurozone work to 
achieve some semblance of economic convergence in order to maintain the Euro as a 
functioning currency?  For many economists, and residents of the Eurozone, the answer is a 
resounding yes.  The costs of a breakup are simply too high, both economically and politically.  
Furthermore, a breakup of the Eurozone would indicate larger problems for the European 
Union as a whole, and would undoubtedly be a setback to the economic and political 
integration towards which the countries of the Union have worked over the past several 
decades.  How, then, can the Eurozone be fixed and the divergences brought to light in the 
sovereign debt crisis be addressed?  As mentioned earlier, an optimal currency area in present-
day Europe would either be smaller and more homogenous than the current Eurozone, more 
closely integrated than the current Eurozone, or both.  So what can be done to meet either of 
these criteria? 
 One of the most obvious, but also one of the most controversial, ideas as to how to fix 
the imbalances and divergences within the Eurozone remains the implementation of a system 
of federal fiscal transfers similar to those in the United States.  This is a solution that could be 
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applied either in the Eurozone at its current size, or in a smaller group.  These transfers would 
eliminate a myriad of issues presented in this paper, primarily issues related to imbalances in 
fiscal expenditures by governments, issues of labor productivity differences, and current 
account deficits and surpluses, and would thus move the Eurozone closer to convergence and 
optimal currency area status.  The current budget of the European Union makes up roughly one 
percent of Europe’s GDP, as compared to that of the United States federal government, which 
comprises roughly twenty percent of the United States’ GDP.  Quite simply put, neither the 
mechanisms nor the scale currently exist in Europe to achieve such fiscal transfers, and 
implementation of such a system would take years, probably with widespread vociferous 
opposition from certain parties. 
 One of the other interesting ideas, as presented by several economists, is the idea of 
breaking the Eurozone up into various “core” versus “periphery” communities, along criteria 
designed to place each current member state into the “community” or currency area that best 
allowed them to meet certain convergence criteria.  This concept, however, would presumably 
be met with widespread opposition and controversy as to which communities certain 
economies would be placed into (particularly Italy); furthermore, many would view it as a step 
backwards, undermining the progress of European economic integration over the past three 
decades.  Additionally, the political implications for such a split would be enormous, with the 
potential to seriously undermine further integration of the European Union.  One must also 
assess whether or not the political will exists in Europe, or in each set of countries, to move 
towards an OCA over the long term, and to weather the conditions that it will bring in both the 
short term and long term. 
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The United States as an OCA 
 In examining various potential developments and outcomes as they relate to Europe 
and the Eurozone’s status as a potential optimal currency area, it is useful to reference several 
other examples of the formation of optimal currency areas throughout history.  While many of 
these OCAs consisted of regions or city-states within countries, few are as developed or as 
salient as the United States.  The United States’ experience is uniquely relevant as a point of 
reference for many of the issues currently faced by Europe with respect to macroeconomic 
integration and the need for convergence.  In particular, many of the political, economic, social, 
and cultural differences that existed in the United States are similar to some of the economic, 
cultural, and political barriers that stand in the way of full European integration.  While there 
are many other examples of optimal currency areas, or currency unions that may or may not 
have been optimal, the United States provides the most applicable model for the Eurozone, 
particularly given the history of federalism in the United States.  Its varied and once-divergent 
economic regions have since moved into closer convergence, with the assistance of federal 
fiscal transfers, the breakdown of cultural and regional barriers, and increased labor mobility, 
to create a United States that now stands as the pre-eminent example of an optimal currency 
area. 
 What, then, is the history of the United States as it relates to a federal fiscal and/or 
monetary policy, and what lessons can be learned from it?  Are there ways in which 
policymakers can apply economic experiences with the United States as an optimal currency 
area to the Eurozone, and if so, what are their limitations?  In what ways might a European 
version of such policy implementation be different, due both to cultural and political 
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differences, but also due to the placement of the Eurozone and the Euro crisis in a different 
period in history? 
 In examining these questions, it can be useful to first take a look at the evolution of the 
United States as a monetary union.  The monetary integration of the States into a single 
currency was not without difficulty; even though monetary union was seen from the outset as a 
prerequisite to political union between the States.  Under the Articles of Confederation, each 
state had the prerogative to print its own money, as the colonies had under British rule (in 
addition to the widespread use of the British pound and Spanish peso).  To prevent squabbling 
and quarrelling amongst the states, adoption of some form of common currency was regarded 
as essential (Rockoff). 
 Rapid deflation and economic divergence after the American Revolutionary War 
produced various economic demands from different regions of the United States, in a manner 
not dissimilar to what is being experienced in Europe today.  Farmers in the western States, 
many of whom were heavily affected by the deflation because of heavy debt burdens, cried for 
tax relief, while states in the Northeast, which had smaller debt burdens, were reluctant to 
agree to debt-relief measures for farmers in the West and South.  The issuance of legal-tender 
paper money was implemented by several states, such as Rhode Island, and these states 
insisted that the paper money be accepted as legal tender.  However, this had the potential to 
cause tensions between the states, as each state could print as much paper money as it 
wanted, at whatever nominal value or exchange rate deemed desirable.  Maintaining state 
currencies at par could have resolved some of this tension, but would not have solved the 
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potential issue of states’ currencies circulating beyond their borders.  Therefore, a monetary 
union (with central oversight) would be necessary before the states could come together under 
a political union with the new Constitution (Rockoff). 
 Even after the establishment of a monetary union, with the federal government 
acquiring authority over a national currency, the first 150 years or so of this new monetary 
union brought repeated regional disputes and infighting.  According to various economists who 
have studied and written about the United States as an optimal currency area, such disputes 
often led to exacerbated economic disturbances, and even sometimes perceptions of regional 
favoritism at both national and regional levels, as policymakers sought to calm regional 
economic storms and balance the demands of economically-divergent areas of the United 
States, particularly during an economic downturn. 
 What is economically beneficial for one region is not always beneficial for another, and 
this has been true for the United States as much as any other country or area.  As we can 
deduce from Mundell’s theory of optimal currency areas, when two economically divergent 
areas are bound together by the same currency or unit of monetary exchange, and there is an 
economic disruption or disturbance in one of the two regions, policymakers have a decision to 
make.  They can alleviate the disruption with monetary tools, which would theoretically lead to 
increased hardship or other undesirable (e.g. inflationary) effects on the other region, or they 
can to allow the disrupted region to continue to suffer out of fear of disrupting the 
economically stable region.  While it is rare to see policymakers make an explicit decision one 
way or the other (as they generally seek a balance between the two), there have been frequent 
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policy debates and tussles in the United States over how exactly to alleviate such regional 
shocks, and how to apply policies that would alleviate stress in economically-shocked regions 
while still protecting the economic activity of stable areas.  As a further extension of this idea, 
policymakers would inevitably face the most blowback from states when such “adverse” 
monetary policies affected regions that were already experiencing real shocks or recession 
(Rockoff), and we see an example of this in Europe, as certain nations were more severely 
affected by actions of the European Central Bank following the global financial crisis of 2007-08. 
 An example from US monetary history of such shocks comes in the form of the Crisis of 
1857.  While the capital markets of the North and South were at least somewhat integrated 
before the Civil War (Bodenhorn and Rockoff), the economic system of the South was based 
upon cotton and other large cash crops while the North was more industrial, and distrust 
between the two regions was high due to political tensions over slavery and other hot-button 
issues of the time.  The Crisis of 1857 started in the North over the failure of a New York 
insurance company, and quickly spread throughout the rest of the country as it affected the 
railroad industry.  Since the years prior to the Crisis had been prosperous, many businesses and 
individuals had taken out large lines of credit, and were hit hard when the crisis came, with real 
market prices dropping in response.  This drop in real prices affected the Southern economy, 
which was largely commodity based, and was viewed by the South as a crisis caused by the 
moneyed and industrialist-capitalist interests of the North. 
The exact origins and development of the Crisis are not our focus; rather, the effects of 
the crisis.  President Buchanan himself deemed paper money and its circulation to be the cause.  
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The South actually ended up suffering little, and the Northeast and Midwest were most 
severely hit.  However, tensions between the South and North flared up as a result of the 
downturn, with many in the South in particular arguing that it would be better off as an 
independent country, free to pursue its own monetary policy.  Similar cases can be seen in 
Europe today, with many in certain countries of the Eurozone (e.g. Germany) arguing that they 
would be better served to leave the zone and the problems associated with being in a currency 
union with Greece, Spain, and the other countries of the periphery. 
The Process of Becoming an OCA: Civil War to New Deal 
The United States was disrupted politically, socially, and economically by the Civil War 
and the subsequent Reconstruction, and much of the work that had been done to integrate 
financial markets throughout the country before the war had to start again from scratch.  The 
process of becoming an optimal currency area during this roughly 70-year long period was 
pushed largely by three main factors: increased labor and capital mobility, a breakdown in 
regional and cultural barriers, and the implementation of large-scale federal fiscal transfers 
between the states. 
With the end of slavery and the readjustment of the Southern economy to the new 
realities of hundreds of thousands of free African-Americans, many of these former slaves 
began to migrate North in search of employment, leading to one of the largest waves of 
migration and first major breakdowns in regional barriers to labor mobility between the North 
and South.  Similarly, the regional barriers and cultural differences between North and South, 
while still predominant, were beginning to weaken with the advent of improved transportation 
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and communication between the states, heralded by the standardization of railroad gauges 
after the war and improved infrastructure as a result of the Reconstruction.  With the nation-
unifying events of World War I and World War II, as well as with the advent of air-conditioning 
and the industrial capabilities now afforded to the South by this technology, the United States 
became more homogenous than ever before, and regional loyalties and differences shrank to 
the lowest level since the Revolutionary War. 
It was not until the implementation of large-scale federal fiscal transfers during the New 
Deal, however, that the United States truly became an optimal currency area.  These transfers 
acted as the final step to render the United States an optimal currency area, and served to 
alleviate regional differences in productivity and per capita income, problems of labor mobility, 
and regional economic shocks with increased government spending, worker welfare programs, 
infrastructure development, and the like. 
The question, then, is this:  Issues of regional economic divergence, similar to those 
faced by the United States historically, exist in the European Union today.  While the Eurozone 
crisis has occurred in a different time and under far different conditions than those of the 
United States’ formation into an optimal currency area, are there applicable lessons for Europe 
in the example of the United States?  Could the Eurozone grow into an optimal currency area in 
a similar fashion to that of the United States? 
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Some Steps toward Becoming an OCA and Their Considerations 
Federal Fiscal Transfers 
 Since federal fiscal transfers have already been discussed partially in this paper, not 
much time will be spent on them here; however, there are a few key points to be made 
regarding the feasibility of such transfers and their scope. 
 Perhaps most important is the point that a system of federal fiscal transfers would seem 
to be the only way to counterbalance the systemic differences in labor productivity and per 
capita income found in today’s Eurozone, as well as one of the most effective ways to combat 
the effects of other macroeconomic divergences.  In looking to the experience of the United 
States, one can see that increased social spending in certain states compensates for various 
divergences, whether higher unemployment, regional shocks or recession due to the economic 
composition of that state, higher inflation, or other divergences. 
 However, implementing this system took considerable time in the case of the United 
States, and would be impossible to implement quickly in Europe.  Growing federal spending and 
a pan-European budget to twenty percent of GDP would take years; expanding the European 
Union budget even to a level where it would begin to have an effect by means of federal fiscal 
transfers would take several years at very least, and probably a decade or more.  In addition, 
such a move would dramatically alter spending at the national level for nearly every 
government in Europe, and such restructuring of national budgets in relation to the EU budget, 
if executed, would probably prove irreversible owing to the presumed economic consequences 
for any country seeking to shift it. 
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 Another important consideration is the political backlash that policymakers might 
encounter from their respective countries in an attempt to implement such a fiscal transfer 
program.  While such a program would doubtless take years to bring to fruition, backlash from 
constituents and national differences in culture and stereotypes would fuel resentment from 
donor countries (read: Germany).  Such a backlash would probably force policymakers to slow 
the implementation of such a program further. 
Increased Capital and Labor Mobility 
 Large steps have been taken in the past few decades to improve both capital mobility 
and labor mobility across Europe.  However, there still remains progress to be made, in regards 
to labor mobility in particular, before the Eurozone can approach OCA status.  A large 
proportion of the “mobile” workforce in Europe is composed of non-European immigrants, who 
have not assimilated culturally or linguistically with their country of residence.  These 
immigrants hardly qualify the rest of the Eurozone for labor mobility, and as has been 
mentioned previously in this paper, the large variety of national cultures and languages that 
exist in the relatively small geographic area of the European Union and the Eurozone further 
complicate this problem of labor immobility.  While the United States can be looked to as an 
example of a monetary union that overcame issues related to labor mobility (e.g., the relative 
immobility of Southerners, particularly African Americans, up until World War II) through a 
combination of increased and improved transportation, improved technologies, and a decrease 
in regional “loyalties” and cultural differences between regions due to the nation-unifying 
events of World Wars I and II, Europe faces the additional obstacles of various language 
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barriers.  In addition, while the federal government of the United States was not as strong and 
powerful historically as it has been since the New Deal, the Eurozone and European Union have 
never experienced a strong federal system working and developing alongside the political 
structures and systems of the individual states in the federation.  These roadblocks threaten to 
render European integration and optimization of the Eurozone more difficult. 
 Steps are being taken, however, to increase the degree of labor mobility and reduce 
cultural barriers within the Eurozone and the European Union as a whole.  A particularly 
interesting example is the Erasmus Program, which is a foreign-exchange program for university 
students that permits them to study in another EU country, and thus obtain valuable 
international and cultural exposure, without the expense of going outside of the EU for 
schooling.  Many have pointed to programs like Erasmus and credited them with building a 
budding class of policymakers for the future who will possess a more European identity, with 
exposure to other parts of the Union; furthermore, the Erasmus program is seen by employers 
as particularly attractive and valuable for job prospects across borders.  These highly educated 
and highly mobile students will undoubtedly bring increased labor mobility and greater 
international cultural understanding to Europe. 
 In addition, it should be noted that it took the United States over 70 years from the Civil 
War until the New Deal to transform itself into an optimal currency area.  In today’s fast-paced 
global economy, certainly neither Europe nor any other region can afford itself 70 years to 
become an optimal currency area.  This begs the question: with seemingly more obstacles and 
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roadblocks to becoming an OCA than the United States faced, can the current Eurozone really 
undergo the process of optimization in less time? 
Macroeconomic Convergence in Euro Countries 
 Achieving macroeconomic convergence amongst member states in the Eurozone will be 
imperative to insure that a similar crisis and divergences do not manifest themselves in the 
future.  However, there are multiple varied approaches and opinions as to which combination 
of policies can help effect the changes necessary to make this convergence a reality. 
 First and foremost to achieving convergence, and economic stability in member 
countries of the Eurozone, is addressing the crushing government debt currently being 
sustained by many Eurozone member governments.  In fact, these debts are arguably the 
biggest threat to economic convergence as they have caused both short term and long term 
crises for member governments and world markets.  The trade-off between austerity and 
growth is one that has sparked tremendous debate amongst policymakers throughout the 
Eurozone, and this debate represents a “Catch 22” scenario, according to Jacques de Larosière.  
While it is unsustainable to continue deficit spending to improve the economic situations in the 
countries currently experiencing these troubles, strict austerity measures and harsh budget cuts 
would also endanger future growth and could cause further recessions or economic downturns 
that could in turn hamper the ability of these governments to bring their national debts under 
control.  The austerity-versus-growth debate has also been a key flashpoint in recent elections 
in Eurozone member states, with over half a dozen incumbent heads of government losing their 
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bids for re-election owing to their varying positions and populist sentiment surrounding the 
issue. 
 One of the key elements in any long term solutions to the Eurozone crisis must be an 
established and enforceable set of convergence criteria similar to those outlined in the Stability 
and Growth Pact.  Although several similar plans have already been proposed, time will tell if 
enforcement will work, and only with solid enforcement of all member states’ violations will 
these convergence criteria be followed.  Policymakers proposing recent steps towards the 
supranational approval of budgets will have to tread carefully, however, as some of these 
measures could potentially be construed as impositions on national sovereignty by the 
European Union as a whole. 
Banking Union in the Eurozone 
 While it is still a developing and ever-changing topic, the concept of and push for a 
banking union within the Eurozone is one that must also be addressed.  A banking union, or a 
set of uniform guidelines and regulations for banks within the Eurozone, is considered by most 
heads of European governments and their regulatory commissions to be of high necessity in 
order to re-establish long-term stability and restore confidence in the financial sector in Europe, 
which has been so badly rocked by the sovereign debt crises affecting various Eurozone 
governments.  Key policymakers, such as Christine Lagarde of the International Monetary Fund 
and Mario Draghi of the European Central Bank, have listed banking reform, and a banking 
union, as a top priority for 2013, and a necessity to avoid the same financial issues as in the 
2007-08 global financial crisis, that then led to many of the sovereign debt issues in Eurozone 
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countries.  As Lagarde stated, “…implementing a banking union with powers to supervise all 
banks in the euro zone should be the currency bloc's top priority…” (Flynn and Thomas). 
 What, then, are the main reasons that the Eurozone, and the Euro crisis, necessitates 
such a banking union?  There are three major aims that have been stated in the attempt to 
establish a banking union, and most of the progress towards these goals has been achieved 
since June 29, 2012, when the leaders of Eurozone countries reached a breakthrough deal to 
allow the direct capitalization of banks in Euro countries from a single supervisory mechanism, 
the European Central Bank.  The first aim of a banking union is to establish uniform and 
common rules and regulations for deposit insurance in the 6,000-plus banks across the 
Eurozone, in an effort to standardize the safety and guarantee on investors’ savings.   
 The next aim for a banking union would be to establish uniform standards for 
supervision, and to have a single supervisory body overseeing all of the banks of the Eurozone.  
Much of the sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone have been caused at least in part by 
sovereigns bailing out national or private banks when they themselves could not afford to do 
so, and a greater emphasis on shared practices and oversight will help to mitigate such risks 
and prevent contagion in the future.  Establishing a standardized set of supervisory procedures 
will eliminate discrepancies that encourage speculation or allow for questionable accounting 
and loan practices among banks, which can lead to further crisis and panic.  
 There remains much debate as to exactly how the banking union will be supervised.  It 
currently appears that the European Central Bank will assume the role of monitoring the 
Eurozone’s banks as the single central supervisory mechanism, although Germany in particular 
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has shown strong opposition to the idea of the ECB taking such a role.  The idea of direct 
capitalization, in and of itself, however, eases many of the headaches related to sovereigns 
bailing out national banks, and then European-wide mechanisms having to bail out the 
sovereigns; as the statement of June 29, 2012 states: “it is imperative to break the vicious circle 
between banks and sovereigns” (Voigt). 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the aim to create a set of “living wills” for 
major banks across the Eurozone; that is, contingency plans should such large banks become 
unstable or unable to manage an existential crisis adequately.  Such living wills would 
effectively detail crisis reaction and management plans, usually including an ordered plan for 
the break-up and liquidation of some or all parts of banks in case of extreme stress or crisis in 
financial markets that cause a bank to become unstable.  These living wills and contingency 
plans outlined therein would be an effective buffer against the type of contagion that 
essentially paralyzed financial markets during the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Why are these changes and reforms important?  With technology increasing the speed 
of financial markets’ reactions, banks are now more subject to volatility and movement in the 
financial world than ever before.  Additionally, with the integration of the Eurozone into a 
common market with a common currency, capital is now more mobile than ever before, and 
with the prevalence and ease of access to banks anywhere in the world (including through the 
internet), increased supervision and uniform regulations are necessary to prevent a recurrence 
of the global financial crisis and the speed with which global markets plummeted in reaction to 
it, leading to questions about the liquidity and stability of banks large and small worldwide. 
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Banking reform and the final parameters of a banking union are far from decided, 
however.  As it is a constantly-evolving topic and set of reforms, and largely because of German 
hesitance to agree to sweeping reforms in the banking sector (particularly German wariness of 
the European Central Bank), there are many details still to be worked out before any long-term 
agreement is reached and real guidelines governing a banking union within the Eurozone are 
established.   
A Counter-Argument to Downsizing 
 So, then, why not split the current Eurozone into several parts, or force individual 
countries out of the currency area, effectively downsizing the Eurozone?  This possibility has 
been discussed by various economists and policymakers, particularly as it relates to the case of 
Greece, and for a brief period of time in 2012, was considered a real possibility.  However, as 
has already been indicated in this paper, the economic and political strain that could result 
from such a downsizing of the Eurozone could potentially be calamitous and cause another 
crisis similar to that which originated with the global financial crisis of 2007-08.  Such a 
downsizing would undermine past and current efforts at European integration as well. 
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Conclusion and Broader Implications 
 In the final analysis, it is left to policymakers to make critical decisions regarding the 
Eurozone.  Having demonstrated that the Eurozone is not currently functioning as an optimal 
currency area, and having laid out several steps that could be taken or conditions that could be 
met in order to move toward optimization, this paper brings us to several important questions.  
What are the costs and benefits involved with each of the strategies presented thus far in the 
debate over how best to handle the Eurozone crisis and underlying systemic problems of 
economic convergence in Europe?  Should long-term political goals and long-term economic 
benefits be placed ahead of short-term economic benefits, or avoidance of a similar crisis?  Do 
Europe’s leaders have the political will to tackle the long-term underlying issues that plague the 
common currency and the Eurozone, even at risk to their own political fortunes?  Do the 
residents and citizens of Eurozone member states have the stomach for short-term economic 
pain for the sake of long-term economic gain?  Does an appetite, or even willingness, exist 
amongst Eurozone member states to tolerate an increase in Euro-wide federal fiscal transfers 
and other steps that might appear unseemly or unfair to the residents of some countries? 
 These are all questions and topics on which dozens more pages could be written, and 
that are unfortunately out of the scope of this paper.  However, having laid out the arguments, 
data, and evidence as to why the Eurozone is not currently functioning as an optimal currency 
area, and understanding the reasons and causes behind the systemic divergences that plague 
its member states, one can hopefully begin to assess what steps policymakers can and should 
take in order to achieve an optimal currency area for the Euro from an economic perspective, 
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as well as from a political perspective.  Policymakers in the Eurozone must address these short-
term and long-term issues in order to advance long-term economic stability on the Continent 
and throughout world markets as well.  The political ramifications of whichever path(s) they 
choose could move Europe closer together in integration, or stall and/or potentially reverse the 
progress made on the European project thus far.  
Ultimately, the Euro is a currency worth saving, and its contributions to the project of 
European integration have been and will continue to be immense and profound.  It will be up to 
policymakers to determine the most pragmatic and feasible compromise between the political 
and economic realities of today and tomorrow as they seek a path forward for the common 
currency, for the Eurozone, and for the European Union. 
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APPENDIX A 
List of Commonly-Used Acronyms 
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 
EEC European Economic Community 
EFSF European Financial Stability Fund 
EMS European Monetary System 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union; European Monetary Union 
ERM Exchange-Rate Mechanism 
ESM European Stability Mechanism 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
OCA Optimal Currency Area; Optimum Currency Area 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PIIGS Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain 
SGP Stability and Growth Pact 
USD United States Dollars 
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APPENDIX B 
Long-term interest rates for Eurozone countries, per cent per year 
Source: OECD 





4.7   4.7   5.6   5.1   5.0   4.2   4.2   3.4   3.8   4.3   4.4   3.9   3.2   3.3   3.0   3.6   
France 5.6   4.6   4.6   5.4   4.9   4.9   4.1   4.1   3.4   3.8   4.3   4.2   3.6   3.1   3.3   2.9   3.5   
Germany 5.7   4.6   4.5   5.3   4.8   4.8   4.1   4.0   3.4   3.8   4.2   4.0   3.2   2.7   2.6   1.8   2.4   
Greece  9.9   8.5   6.3   6.1   5.3   5.1   4.3   4.3   3.6   4.1   4.5   4.8   5.2   9.1   15.7   22.4   22.2   
Ireland 6.3   4.7   4.8   5.5   5.0   5.0   4.1   4.1   3.3   3.8   4.3   4.6   5.2   6.0   9.6   7.0   7.6   
Italy 6.9   4.9   4.7   5.6   5.2   5.0   4.3   4.3   3.6   4.0   4.5   4.7   4.3   4.0   5.4   5.6   6.3   
Netherlands 5.6   4.6   4.6   5.4   5.0   4.9   4.1   4.1   3.4   3.8   4.3   4.2   3.7   3.0   3.0   2.2   2.8   
Portugal 6.4   4.9   4.8   5.6   5.2   5.0   4.2   4.1   3.4   3.9   4.4   4.5   4.2   5.4   10.2   12.1   12.7   
Spain 6.4   4.8   4.7   5.5   5.1   5.0   4.1   4.1   3.4   3.8   4.3   4.4   4.0   4.2   5.4   5.2   5.8   
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APPENDIX C 
Government debt levels as a percentage of GDP 
Source: OECD 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 66.4 63.4 68.7 74.4 78.1 79.7 83.0 84.4 
France 71.2 73.0 79.3 91.2 95.8 100.1 105.5 107.3 
Germany 69.8 65.6 69.8 77.4 86.8 87.2 88.5 87.8 
Greece 117.0 115.4 118.7 134.0 149.6 170.0 168.0 173.1 
Ireland 29.0 28.6 49.5 71.1 98.4 114.1 121.6 126.9 
Italy 116.7 112.1 114.6 127.7 126.5 119.7 122.7 122.1 
Netherlands 54.5 51.5 64.8 67.5 70.6 75.2 81.0 83.6 
Portugal 77.3 75.4 80.7 92.9 103.2 117.6 124.3 130.1 
Spain 46.2 42.3 47.7 62.9 67.1 75.3 87.9 90.9 
Euro area 74.7 71.8 77.0 87.8 93.1 95.1 99.1 99.9 
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APPENDIX D 
GDP Composition and Labor Force Occupation by Sector 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
 
 GDP Composition by Sector Labor Force Occupation by Sector 
 Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
Austria 1.5 29.4 69.1 5.5 27.5 67 
France 1.9 18.3 79.8 3.8 24.3 71.8 
Germany 0.8 28.1 71.1 1.6 24.6 73.8 
Greece 3.8 16 80.1 12.4 22.4 65.1 
Ireland 2 29 69 5 19 76 
Italy 2 23.9 74.1 3.9 28.3 67.8 
Netherlands 2.8 24.1 73.2 2 18 80 
Portugal 2.6 22.6 74.8 11.7 28.5 59.8 
Spain 3.3 24.2 72.6 4.2 24 71.7 
EU 1.8 24.6 73.5 5.3 22.9 71.8 
       
USA 1.2 19.1 79.7 0.7 20.3 79.1 
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APPENDIX E 
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APPENDIX F 
Government surplus/deficit as a percentage of GDP, 2006-2013 
Source: OECD 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria -1.7 -1.0 -1.0 -4.2 -4.5 -2.6 -2.9 -2.3 
France -2.4 -2.7 -3.3 -7.6 -7.1 -5.2 -4.5 -3.0 
Germany -1.7 0.2 -0.1 -3.2 -4.3 -1.0 -0.9 -0.6 
Greece -6.0 -6.8 -9.9 -15.6 -10.5 -9.2 -7.4 -4.9 
Ireland 2.9 0.1 -7.3 -14.0 -31.2 -13.0 -8.4 -7.6 
Italy -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.5 -3.8 -1.7 -0.6 
Netherlands 0.5 0.2 0.5 -5.5 -5.0 -4.6 -4.3 -3.0 
Portugal -4.6 -3.2 -3.7 -10.2 -9.8 -4.2 -4.6 -3.5 
Spain 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.3 -8.5 -5.4 -3.3 
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APPENDIX G 
Change in GDP per capita, 2002-2011 
Source: OECD 
Change in GDP per capita, 2002-2011 
Country 2002 2011 
% 
Change 
Austria 32306.477 36131.136 11.84% 
France 28668.214 29938.053 4.43% 
Germany 30658.694 34580.83 12.79% 
Greece 21757.745 22287.413 2.43% 
Ireland 35758.035 37210.02 4.06% 
Italy 28253.97 27081.473 -4.15% 
Netherlands 33894.122 37119.365 9.52% 
Portugal 21438.681 21414.419 -0.11% 
Spain 26095.389 26981.212 3.39% 
Euro area 28523.301 30166.827 5.76% 
 
Time 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Country                     
Austria 32306.48 32441.23 33072.75 33636.82 34691.25 35833.84 36193.31 34713.93 35321.56 36131.14 
France 28668.21 28724.19 29241.49 29554.47 30075.7 30575.91 30383.61 29270.93 29597.8 29938.05 
Germany 30658.69 30529.52 30891.12 31116.58 32306.28 33404.16 33824.79 32186.62 33573.24 34580.83 
Greece 21757.75 22975.76 23896.43 24348.48 25586.7 26386.6 26226.23 25300.75 23997.2 22287.41 
Ireland 35758.04 36541.7 37476.38 38794.73 39921.05 41088.96 39520.51 37154.34 36806.42 37210.02 
Italy 28253.97 28021.52 28226.88 28279.89 28737.72 29007.9 28453.55 26729.15 27082.53 27081.47 
Netherlands 33894.12 33849.36 34493.88 35111.42 36249.55 37584.99 38118.63 36530.19 36932.61 37119.37 
Portugal 21438.68 21095.49 21300.42 21368.96 21606.92 22067.98 22036.86 21375.69 21779.83 21414.42 
Spain 26095.39 26459.3 26881.9 27392.01 28075.13 28530.49 28330.45 27070.01 26899.47 26981.21 
Euro area 28523.3 28552.22 28996.35 29313.99 30107.7 30829.83 30779.27 29326.04 29825.5 30166.83 
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APPENDIX H 




1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 1.7   2.5   0.3   1.3   0.2   1.6   1.5   1.9   1.8   -0.8   -2.8   1.6   1.5   0.2   1.4   
France 0.9   1.2   0.3   0.4   0.8   2.2   1.2   1.5   0.8   -0.7   -1.8   1.4   1.1   0.7   1.0   
Germany 0.2   1.6   1.4   0.6   0.5   0.4   1.0   3.3   1.7   -0.4   -5.1   3.1   1.7   0.3   1.8   
Greece 3.1   3.0   4.1   1.2   4.7   1.9   -0.7   3.6   1.4   -0.9   -3.0   -1.7   -0.2   -0.3   -0.2   
Ireland 3.2   4.6   1.7   4.2   2.3   1.1   0.4   0.9   1.5   -1.9   1.2   4.0   2.8   0.7   1.9   
Italy 0.3   1.9   -0.3   -1.2   -1.4   1.1   0.5   0.3   0.3   -1.4   -3.9   2.5   0.2   -1.4   0.0   
Netherlands 2.0   1.7   -0.1   -0.4   0.8   2.9   1.7   1.7   1.3   0.3   -2.8   1.9   0.9   -0.4   0.7   
Portugal 2.7   1.8   0.2   0.2   -0.3   1.6   1.1   0.9   2.4   -0.5   -0.3   3.0   -0.1   0.7   0.2   
Spain 0.2   0.0   0.4   0.2   -0.1   -0.4   -0.5   0.1   0.4   1.1   3.2   2.6   2.8   2.6   0.3   
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APPENDIX I 
Inflation change from previous year, percent, 2002-12 
Using harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) 
Source: OECD 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 1.6998 1.2961 1.9501 2.1077 1.6858 2.202 3.2243 0.4032 1.6921 3.5515 2.5723 
France 1.9378 2.1691 2.3421 1.8996 1.9125 1.6068 3.1587 0.103 1.7355 2.2935 2.2203 
Germany 1.3547 1.0308 1.7899 1.9198 1.7836 2.2764 2.7542 0.2338 1.1505 2.4823 2.1372 
Greece 3.9176 3.44 3.0271 3.4849 3.3134 2.9885 4.2325 1.3488 4.7005 3.1186 1.0369 
Ireland 4.7249 3.9953 2.2999 2.18 2.7002 2.8727 3.108 -1.706 -1.572 1.1861 1.9225 
Italy 2.6098 2.8121 2.2735 2.2059 2.2167 2.0382 3.4995 0.7642 1.6395 2.9019 3.3035 
Netherlands 3.8664 2.2365 1.3798 1.5022 1.6508 1.583 2.2105 0.9743 0.9297 2.4769 2.8223 
Portugal 3.678 3.2583 2.5091 2.1268 3.0433 2.4229 2.6514 -0.903 1.3894 3.5568 2.7774 
Spain 3.589 3.1022 3.0532 3.3823 3.5625 2.8437 4.1296 -0.238 2.0426 3.0521 2.436 
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